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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT*
CONSTITUTIONALITY OP THE KENTUCKY ACT

In 1914, Kentucky enacted a worlnen's compensation act,
which was declared unconstitutional in Kentucky State Jour%alCompany v. Warkmen's Compensation Board.37 The present
act, as previously stated, was enacted in 1916.
Before considering the objections urged to the constitutionality of the present act, it is necessary to understand the
grounds upon which the 1914 act was condemned, for they furnish the setting for several of the most important provisions of
the 1916 act.
The suit was brought to compel the State Journal Company to file certain papers with the commission, as required by
the act. A demurrer to the petition was filed on the ground
that the act was unconstitutional. The demurrer was overruled
by the circuit court and an appeal was taken to the Court of
Appeals, where the act was declared unconstitutional by 'a divided court, four judges deciding against the act and three supporting it.38
The storm centered around sections 29, 30, 31, 32 and 34 of
the act. It will be necessary to consider the substance of these
sections.
Section 29 provided that any employee, subject to the act,
might contract with his employer, who was subject to the act,
and who elected to pay the premiums provided by the act, to
accept compensation in lieu of any cause of action which he or
his representative might have arising from the negligence of
his employer and to waive all causes of action against the employer, conferred by the constitution or statutes of the state,
or by the common law, for his injury or death occurring through
the negligence of the employer or his agents.
* The first installment of this article was published in the November issue of this journal. Vol. XIII, p. 20.
31Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Board,
161 Ky. 562, 170 S. W. 1166, L. R. A. 191 6A, 369.
Two of the regular judges, Judges Hannah and Nunn, having declined to sit in this case because of interest, pursuant to section 117
of the Constitution, Hon. A. L. Dorsey, of Henderson, and Hon. J. M.
Lassing, of Newport, were appointed by the Governor as special judges.
Judges Settle, Carroll, Turner and Dorsey voted against the constitutionality of the act. Judges Lassing, Miller, and Chief Justice Hobson
dissented.
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Section 30 provided that such a contract between an employer and employee should be conclusively presumed to have
been made in every case where an employer had elected to pay
into the fund, if such employee should continue to work for the
employer thereafter with notice that the employer had elected
to pay into the fund; and the posting of printed or typewritten
notices in conspicuous places about the employer's place of business, at the time of the election of the employer to pay into
the fund, that he had so elected, should constitute sufficient
notice to all of his employees of the fact that he had made such
an election; and the continuance in the service of such employer
should be deemed a waiver by the employe of his right of action, except as provided in section 32.
Section 31 provided that any employer electing to take
advantage of the provisions of the statute should not be liable'
in damages at common law or by statute for the injury or death
of employes, occurring through the negligence of the employer
or his agents, provided the employer was not in default with his
premiums.
Section 32 provided that any employee, prior to receiving
an injury, might give notice to his employer, who had elected
to pay into the fund, that he would not accept the benefit of the
act and waive his right of action as provided thereby, such notice
to be served on the employer and a copy mailed to the compensation board. If, thereafter, the employee should be injured or
killed, while in the service of the employer, who had elected to
operate under the act, and an action should be instituted
against the employer to recover damages, the employer might
rely upon the defenses of contributory negligence, assumed risk
and the fellow servant rule.
Section 34 provided that an employer who did not elect to
pay into the compensation fund the premiums provided by the
act should not, in a suit against him for personal injuries or
death of an employee, avail himself of the defenses of assumption
of risk, contributory negligence, or the fellow servant rule.
It was claimed that the act was invalid for many reasons,
but the court based its examination and decision upon the following three grounds:
"(1) The act was violative of section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution which provides: 'The General Assembly shall have no power to
limit the amount to be recovered for injuries to person or property.'
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"(2)
The act was compulsory in that both the employers and employees were compelled to accept its provisions, and, being compulsory,
it deprived appellant of its property without due process of law, in violation of section 54 of the Constitution.
The act was in contravention of section 241 of the Constitu"(3)
tion which reads as follows: 'Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by negligence or wrongful act, then, in
every such case, damages may be recovered for such death from the
corporations and persons so causing same. . . . ' The right of action is given to the personal representative."

The court recognized that the regulation of the management of the industries of the state, which may affect the health,
safety or morals of persons employed in such industries comes
within the police power of the state.
If the employer and employee contracted to accept the provisions of the act there was of course a limitation of the amount
which the employee recovered for injury, but it was within the
power of the employee to waive section 54 of the Constitution
by contract, provided the contract was freely and voluntarily
made.
But the act provided that though there might never be a
word spoken between the employer and employee, the employee
was conclusively presumed to have accepted the provisions of
the act if the employer paid his premium and posted notice that
he had accepted the provisions of the act and the employee continued in his service. If the employee did not desire to accept
and wished to rely on his constitutional and statutory rights,
he had to give notice to his employer and to the board. Even
then his employer would be given the opportunity to rely upon
the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk
and the fellow servant rule.
When his right to recover was restricted by such qualifications and conditions, the court held that there was such a limitation upon the amount of recovery as to bring the act under
the condemnation of section 54 of the Constitution.
The court was inclined to think that mere silence on the
part of an employee was not such an affirmative act as to imply
his acceptance by the contract. Moreover, in the light of section
54 of the Constitution, the contract would be compulsory and
void, for the legislature has no power to say to one of its citizens, "Unless you accept the provisions of a law impairing your
constitutional rights, other rights more valuable will be taken
from you."
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It will be shown that the court in a later opinion 3 9 modified
its attitude in the latter respect and held that the legislature
can coerce the employee to accept the provisions of such an act,
if the employer has done so, by giving the employer the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the
fellow servant rule.
'The court held the act compulsory even as to the employer.
He was told, "You may refuse to accept the provisions of the
act, but if any suit is instituted against you for injuries received by your employes, you will be deprived of all defenses
thereto, and to all intents and purposes a default judgment will
be rendered against you.
In the additional opinion 40 the court held the provisions of
the act as to the employer to be unobjectionable since, though
compulsory, they did not conflict with any provisions of the
Constitution.
The court also held the act unconstitutional as depriving
the personal representative of a right of action to recover damages for such negligence as resulted in deceased's death, as
provided in section 241 of the Constitution. "It seems to us that
such parts of the act as take from the personal representative
or estate of a deceased employee, who left no dependents surviving him, any part of the compensation due such representative or his estate, and directs its payment into this fund for the
benefit of other people, is a violation of section 241 of the Constitution. ' 41 The legislature has no power to limit the damages which belong to the dependents of an employee who is negligently killed. Nor can the legislature take what is due the estate of one man and give it to another.
A petition for a rehearing was fied and the court made the
following suggestions for a valid compensation law :42
(1) An employee coming within the provisions of the act
may accept them, but he must do so by some affirmative act.
Mere silence on his part is not sufficient.
Green v. Caldwe l, Chairman, et al., 170 Ky. 571.
,"A petition for a rehearing having been filed, Judge Dorsey handed
down an additional opinion. (162 Ky. 387.)
"The act provided that unless the decedent left dependents within
a specified enumeration, the board could recover from the employer and
credit the amount to the compensation fund for the benefit of the class
to which such employee belonged.
4 See 40, supra.
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.(2) The amount recovered should be paid to his dependents, if he leaves any, and if not, to his personal representatives. The legislature has no power to direct that such sum be
paid into the compensation fund.
As might be expected, the 1916 act was framed with especial care to eliminate the objectionable compulsory features of
the 1914 act.
The employer cannot bring the employee under the provisions of the act without the employee's consent in writing. 43
This affirmative acceptance does not occur in any other compensation law in the United States and is a serious handicap to
44
the administration of the act.
If the employee fails to accept in writing or to authorize
some one to accept in writing in his presence he is barred from
participation in the benefits of the act, although he may desire
to avail himself of them.
The present Constitution should be amended so as to render
this requirement unnecessary.
It was urged that though the form of acceptance is voluntary that the compulsory feature of the act of 1914 was preserved in that part of section 4961 which denies to the employee
who has declined to come under the act the right of recovery
for injuries due to the employers' negligence, if the employer
can show contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or an
application of the fellow servant rule.
The court held that although the employee who does not
elect to accept the provisions of the act is met by these three defenses, when he seeks to recover damages in an action at law, he
still has his cause of action as he always had and his employer
has the right to rely on the same defenses that he had before
the act.
But the real deciding consideration is that the employee
"has the right to use his voluntary, independent judgment
and do as he pleases.'"'4 That is all that is necessary to remove
the charge of compulsion. He may be coerced but he is not compelled to accept the provisions of the act.
A similar contention is made in respect to the employerthat he, too, is compelled to accept the provisions of the act.
4 Hollenback v. Hoflenbac, 181 Ky. 262; Mc~une v. Pell,192 Ky. 22.
"Annual Report of Workmen's Compensation Board, 1918-19, p. 12.
"See 39, supra.
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This ground of attack arises out of the fact that the employer,
who elects to accept the provisions of the act is given the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the
fellow servant rule if the employee does not elect to come under
the act, as stated above, but such employer will be denied these
defenses by section 4960, if he does not elect to operate under
the act.
The contention is made that the act, by taking from the
non-electing employer certain defenses, which he had before its
passage, deprives him of his property without due process of
law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The answer to this objection is that the legislature has the
power to give or take away these defenses as it chooses. The
employer has no vested right in them. The law gave them to
him; what the law gives it can take away. The legislature could
take them away without giving the employer any election at all.
Besides, the burden is not arbitrarily placed upon him and
he can choose as he likes.
And yet, we must admit that the employer and employee
alike are almost compelled to accept the provisions of the act.
The system is voluntary in theory, but practically compulsory
in fact.46 The non-electing employer is strongly coerced into
accepting the act by having his common law defenses taken
from him. Without these defenses he can hope for little success if sued by an injured employee. About the only thing for
the jury to do would be to assess the amount of damages. The
employer knows what his premiums will cost under the act and
he realizes that he would rather assume this known burden than
take a chance with a jury with his common law defenses cut off.
The employee is as strongly coerced. He knows that under
the act he will simply have to prove that the injury occurred by
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.
But if the employer is given the defenses of assumption of risk,
contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule, and besides surmounting these the employee must prove the negligence
of the employer, there is small hope of an adequate recovery for
the employee. He has already learned that under the old system.
So he chooses a known compensation, though it be less, in prewWorkmen's Compensation, Rhodes, page 113.
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ference to assuming the risk of proving his claim under these
difficulties. But if, after accepting, he is injured by the negligence of the employer, he has been induced to give up valuable
rights in accepting the provisions of the act.
This coercion of employer and employee to persuade them to
come under the act has been criticised as a piece of legislative
trickery. 47 The criticism is justified. But this elective system,
although coercive, has enabled the states to avoid the difficulties of constitutional limitations. Perhaps the end justifies the
means in this case. At least the system has overcome many of
the weaknesses of the common law system, which justifies its existence.
The employee's election to become bound by the Workmen's
Compensation Act defeats the right of action given to the personal representative by section 241 of the Kentucky Constitution. The personal representative had no vested right in the
cause of action that he could not be deprived of by statute sup48
plemented by the contract of the employe.
Concerning this point in a case 40 where both the employer
and employee had accepted the provisions of the act and the administrator sued, the court said, "Since the deceased had the
power by voluntary contract to accept the provisions of the act,
fixing the amount that should be recovered in the event of his
death, and since compensation for death provided by the act is
in lieu of all other liability, it necessarily follows that the act
controls, and that an action for damages will not lie."
Much emphasis has been laid upon the criticism that compensation acts in general create liability without fault. The
employer is made liable for an accident which may be wholly
inevitable, or at least not due to his negligence, and yet he must
pay compensation.
Liability without fault is not a novelty in the law. Ir.
Wambaugh cites trover, trespass, slander, and libel as examples
where moral obliquity is not a part. The common law liability
of the carrier, of the innkeeper and of the owner of a mischievous animal may be cited as additional cases where liability was
4

Constitutional Status of Workmen's Compensation. Ernest
Freund in American Labor Legislation Review, vol. 2, page 55.
Crannison's Aamrx. v. Bates & Rogers Const. Co., 187 Ky. 538.
Pe-nn's Adinr. v. Bates & Rogers Const. Co., 183 Ky. 529.
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not altogether dependent on the question of negligence or fault.
The most innocent may incur civil liability without fault.
The liability of the employer may well be put under the
maxim "respondeat superior." In a well known English case50
this maxim was said to be bottomed on the principle that he who
expects to derive benefit from an act which is done by another
for him must answer for the injury which a third person may
sustain from it. The United States Supreme Court has considered the application of this principle to workmen's compensation acts. "The provision for compulsory compensation, in
the act under consideration, cannot be deemed to be arbitrary
nor an unreasonable application of the principle, so as to amount
to a deprivation of the employer's property without due process
of law. The pecuniary loss resulting from the employee's death
or disablement must fall somewhere. It results from something
done in the course of an operation from which the employer
expects to derive a profit. In excluding the question of fault
as a cause of injury, the act in effect disregards the proximate
cause and looks to one more remote-the primary cause as it
may be deemed-and that is, to the employment itself. For
this, both parties are responsible, since they voluntarily agree
to engage in it as co-adventurers, with personal injury to the
employee as a probable and foreseen result. . . . Viewing
the entire matter, it cannot be pronounced arbitrary for the
state to impose upon the employer the absolute duty of maintaining a moderate and definite compensation in money to every
disabled employee, or in case of his death to those who were entitled to look to him for support, in lieu of the common law
liability confined to cases of negligence.' '51
This view may be compared with the article by r. Wambaugh in which he points out that the employer is not outside
of the chain of causation. Neither employer nor employee is
wholly innocent. Both are engaged in a transaction which each
knows is dangerous. The common law put the responsibility
on the employee. The compensation acts shift the burden to the
employer. "In placing the responsibility upon one of the parties in the chain of causation rather than upon the other, are
the acts outrageous?" Obviously this is a legitimate transfer
'0 HaN v. Smith, 2 Bing. 156, 160.
"Mr. Justice Pitney in Yew York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243

U. S. 188.
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of responsibility, especially when we consider that the employer
can so easily pass the burden to the consumer, as it is presumed
he will do in all compensation acts.
Should workmen's compensation laws be elective or compulsory? This has been a big problem to legislators, especially in
view of constitutional limitations in many states. The general
consensus of opinion seems to be that they should be compulsory. 52 The progress of such legislation has shown the need for
such laws and they can be supported under the police power of
the state. If constitutional limitations are in the way of a compulsory law, the Constitution should be amended.
The Massachusetts Industrial Accident Board in its annual
report for 1913 says: "It has become evident, that as a matter
of justice and public welfare, compensation acts should be uniform and compulsory and apply to all employees and occupations
alike. For about one quarter of the employees and their families in Massachusetts to be left practically unprotected from
evils consequent upon occupational injuries is unsatisfactory
as a permanent condition. The reason for maling such laws
elective in form, as has been done in most of the states which
have adopted them, is to avoid possible constitutional objections.
The elective method makes a needlessly complicated and cumbersome legal and administrative enforcement of the act."

THE

ADmuNISTRATION OF THE ACT

The Board.
One of the defects of the common law system of damages
for the injury or death of an employee who was injured in the
course of his employment, was the litigation which was necessary to enforce the rights of the employee. He was unable to
stand either the expense or the delay. In order to remedy these
defects and to provide the detailed attention and flexible machinery necessary for the proper administration of the act an
administrative board was created by the act.5 3
The Workmen's Compensation Board, as it is designated,
is composed of three members appointed by the Governor with
the approval of the Senate for terms of four years each. The
act calls for their appointment by the Governor and does not
12 Compulsory Compensation Laws, L. C. Williams.
Comment 296.
"Kentucky Statutes, section 4920, et seq.

22 Case and
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include approval by the Senate in express words, but it has been
held in an interesting case5 4 that in view of Kentucky Statutes,
section 3750, "unless otherwise provided" all persons appointed by the Governor hold office subject to the consent of the
Senate. So board members appointed during a vacation by a
Governor could not claim their places on the board against
appointees of his successor when the subsequent appointees
were approved and the prior ones rejected at the first meeting
of the Senate after its vacation.
Each member of the board holds office for four years, or
until his successor is appointed. The first appointees were appointed for two, three and four years respectively, the member
appointed for two years being designated as chairman. Since
that time the senior member in service is chairman.
No person is eligible to appointment as a member unless
he is thirty years of age, and a resident of Kentucky not less
than three years consecutively next preceding his appointment.
No person accepting appointment is eligible to election or appointment to any public office during his term of office, nor does
resignation relieve him from this provision.
The Governor may remove members from office at any time
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, misconduct in office, political
activity, or if they become ineligible. Such a member is given
a copy of the charges preferred against him in advance and an
opportunity of a public hearing upon at least ten days' notice.
The Attorney General assists the Governor in such proceedings. Attendance of witnesses may be procured by either party
and their testimony is taken as provided by the Civil Code in
ordinary actions. If such a member is removed, the complete
record is filed with the Secretary of State and becomes a public
record of the state.
Any member may also be removed by the Senate by regular impeachment proceedings.
The board appoints a secretary and a medical director and
such other assistants and employees as are necessary to the
proper administration of the act.
The appointment of a disinterested medical officer is a
wise solution to a difficult problem. The testimony of physicians representing the opposing parties has a tendency to be
" BeweNl v. Bennett, 187 Ky. 626.
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highly contradictory in many cases. Indeed, expert testimony
is often a serious disappointment as a means of ascertaining
the real extent of the injury.
The board gives careful consideration to the expert testimony of the physicians presented by either party but is fortunate that it can rely in a peculiar degree upon the testimony
of a disinterested and reputable physician, who as medical
director of the board, as a sort of amicus curiae, may state his
findings in an absolutely unbiased manner.55
Members of the board give bond in the sum of $10,000 for
the faithful performance of their duties, the premiums are paid
out of the maintenance fund.
Sessions may be held at any place in the state where necessary and the board has power to sue or institute legal proceedings in any court of the Commonwealth under existing laws
as to jurisdiction of actions. All proceedings of the board are
recorded in a book kept for that purpose by the secretary, which
constitutes a public record and which contains an entry of each
case considered by the board with the decision thereon. All
papers in a proceeding are filed likewise at the main office.
Hearings may be held by one member of the board or by
a referee acting fpr him under authorization of the board,
which, when approved by a majority of the members and indicated on a record of the proceedings of the board is deemed to
be an order of the board.
The board may make rules, not inconsistent with the act,
for carrying out the provisions of the act. In conformity with
this provision the board has formulated a considerable number
of rules relating to standard forms to be filled out, etc. These
rules must be complied with by those seeking to avail themselves of the provisions of the act. If such rules were unreasonable, appeal could be had to the courts.
The board makes an annual report to the Governor on or
-before the 15th day of December for the preceding fiscal year.
This report includes a statement of the number of awards made
and the number of claims rejected, a financial statement, etc.,
and includes any recommendations the board may have to make.
The legislature has been rather considerate of the board's rec15Harry Bateman v. Bethlehem Steel Bridge Corp., 1 Ky. Leading
Decisions 74.

Tm WoRxldN's COmPENsATI0N ACT
ommendations and several of them have passed amendments to
the act.
The board is under obligation to publish and distribute
among employers and employees such general information as to
the business of the department as may be necessary, taking care
that such distribution does not come under the section of the
act"0 prohibiting political activity by the board members.
The annual report does not exceed five hundred copies and
is paid for out of any funds in the state treasury not otherwise
appropriated. Such reports, as well as paper-backed volumes
of Leading Decisions of the board, are available to the public.5 7
Procedure.
One of the two methods provided by the Kentucky act for
the settlement of compensation eases is by voluntary agreement
of the parties. 58 If the employer and employe reach an agreement in regard to compensation, a memorandum of such agreement must be filed with the board. No agreement is binding
until it has been approved by the board.
If the parties fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation, or if they have previously filed an agreement with
the board and the parties thereafter disagree, either party may
make written application to the board for a hearing and ruling
upon the issues. Such application must be filed as soon as is
practicable after the disagreement, or after the cessation of
voluntary payments, if any have been made.
It would seem that lump sum payments can not later be set
aside if made by order of the court, for section 4709 provides
that "upon payment of such lump sum, all liability for the payments therein commuted shall cease."
Attention is called to the fact that it is the purpose of the
act to foster an amicable settlement of claims by the employer
and employe. The board approved 2,503 agreements during the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1918.59 Such personal settlements
have a tendency to preserve the friendly relations of employer
and employee and are always far more satisfactory than the aid
.of a compensation board could hope to be.
Kentucky Statutes, section 4922.
0 The board has published four volumes of Leading Decisions.
51Kentucky Statutes, section 4931.
'

Second Annual Report of Compensation Board, page 20.
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Thus it is well that agreements which have been approved
by the board can only be set aside for causes coming under seotion 4902 of the act, which include a showing of a change of
conditions from those when the original award or order was
made by the board, or mistake, or fraud.
An agreement approved by the board is enforceable like
an award or order of the board and cannot be set aside except
for the above reasons. Thus a change of physical condition
of the employee may remain open to inquiry after approval of
agreement by the board, but all other essentials of the agreement are res adjud4icata, as far as the parties are concerned.60
If the parties have applied to have a previous agreement
set aside, or there is in the first instance a failure of agreement, and the application is fied, the board will grant a hearing. In advance of directing a hearing a member of the board
or a referee authorized by it may confer informally with the
parties to assist in adjusting their difficulties, but such friendly
arbitration may not delay the granting of a hearing over the
objection of either party.
The board or any of its members may hear the parties.
Section 4926 of the act as ordinarily enacted provided for the
appointment of one member from each of the three districts
into which the state was divided by the act and provided that
each member was required to hold office hours one day each week
at some point within his district. But the jurisdiction of the
members to hear complaints covers the whole state, and since
the amendment of section 4926,01 the members are no longer
required to maintain office hours in the district from which they
are appointed. Indeed, the amendment does not provide such
"districting" of the state and members may now be appointed
without regard to such arbitrary demarcation.
The hearings are usually near the scene of the accident, but
the parties may agree with the board's consent to hold the
hearing elsewhere.
The dispute is determined in a summary manner. According to Bouvier, a summary proceeding is a form of trial in
which the ancient, established course of legal proceedings is
disregarded. There is no.jury. "In a summary manner does
0Spooner v. P. 1. Beckwith's Estate, 149 N. W. 971.
"Amended Mar. 29, 1918.
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not at all mean . . . without notice or hearing, but simply
without a trial in the ordinary forms prescribed by law'
S.
for a regular judicial procedure." 2
The board or any member has the power to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, or cause them to be administered, and
to examine such part of the books and records to a proceeding
as relate to the question in dispute, or if desired, another may
be authorized to make such inspection for the board or for any
member. The county sheriff serves all subpoenas thus issued, receiving the same fee as provided for like services in civil actions, and all witnesses thus summoned are paid for attendance
and mileage as in civil cases in the courts. The circuit court
enforces the attendance of witnesses and their testimony, and
the production and examination of the books of the parties, if
necessary.
The award of the board, together with a statement of the
findings of fact and rulings of law, are filed with a record of the
proceedings at Frankfort, and a copy of the record is sent to
the parties immediately.
If an application for review is made within seven days
from the date of award, a review before the full board will be
granted. This is in cases where the first hearing was before a
single member of the board. If all members sat in the first
hearing, a rehearing will only be granted because of mistake
or fraud, of change of conditions, as mentioned above. It is
the intention of the act that only the transcript of evidence be
reviewed by the full board, but the parties and their witnesses
may be heard again by the full board, if practicable. The
costs accruing through the introduction of new witnesses are
borne by the party introducing them. The award and findings
are filed as above.
An award or order of the board, if application for review
is not fied, is conclusive on all questions of fact in the absence
of fraud.0 3 But either party may within twenty days after the
order or award is rendered, appeal to the circuit court, which
would have had jurisdiction of an action for damages for the
injuries for a review of the order or award.
Upon review, these findings of fact will not be disturbed
6Western, etc. R. R. Co. v. Atlanta, 113 Ga. 537.
ONelson v. Kentucky River Sand & Stone Co., 182 Ky. 317.
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if supported by credible evidence. 64 "The same rule will be applied to the findings of fact of the board of compensation as to
the verdict of a properly instructed jury and unless the findings
be clearly, flagrantly and palpably against the weight of evidence, it will not be disturbed by the court.6 5
It has been held G6 that an appeal to the circuit court is not
commenced by filing the petition within twenty days and the
serving of copies on the respondent alone, but the appellant
must also cause a summons to issue on the petition for appeal
on a period within twenty days. No new evidence may be introduced on the appeal except as to fraud or the misconduct of
some person engaged in the administration of the act, which
affects the award. The court hears the case upon the record or
abstract of the record and disposes of the question in a summary manner. The review is limited to determining whether
67
or not:
(1) The board acted without or in excess of its power.
(2) The order, decision, or award was procured by fraud.
(3) The order, decision, or award is not in conformity with the
provisions of the act.
(4) If findings of facts are in issue, whether such findings of
fact support the order, decision, or award.
Findings of law as found by the board are not conclusive
if either party appeals. The constitutional or fundamental
powers of the courts to review questions of law cannot be limited by provisions that might be inserted in workmien's compensation acts, where the preliminary examination is before
an administrative body.66
Appeal is provided to the Court of Appeals where the
amount involved is sufficient. 69 The scope of review by this
court includes -all matters made the subject of review by the
circuit court and also errors of law arising in the circuit court.
Any agreements under this act, which have been properly
approved by the board, or orders or awards of the board, or an
Valentine v. Weaver, 191 Ky. 37 Hollenbach v. tBo~lenbach, 131
Ky. 262; Bates & Rogers Const. Co. v. Allen, 183 Ky. S15; Andrews Steel
Co. v. McDermott, 192 Ky. 79.
OHollenbak v. Hollenbach 64, supra.
caId.

O'Nelson v. Kentucky Stone & Sand Co., 63, supra.
I' See L. R. A. (1916A) 270; Kentucky Workmen's Compensation,
Dosker, page 247.

"Kentucky Statutes, section 950.

THE WoRxMBN's

COMPENSATION ACT

award of the board rendered upon appeal, may be enforced by
filing a certified copy of the same in the circuit court of the
county where the injury occurred. The court renders judgment
upon the award or agreement and such judgment has the same
effect as though it had been rendered in a suit heard and determined by the court.
Evidence.
The board is not a court, but a legislative agency created by
statute to administer a specified legislative act.t 0 Since the
board is an administrative tribunal and is not hampered by a
jury, it is possible to carry on its proceedings with a more liberal system of iules of evidence than is possible in a law court.
Itis provided in section 4930 of the act that "processes and
procedure under this act shall be as summary and simple as
reasonably may be." Section 4933 provides that the dispute
shall be determined in a summary manner. Section 4930 further provides that the board may make rules, not inconsistent
with the act, to carry out the provisions of the act.
Accepting these provisions-that the proceedings shall be
determined in a summary manner and that the board may make
its own rules, let us see how far the courts have permitted the
board to be free from common law rules of evidence.
The burden of proof that the injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment and by accident is upon the employee.
'While it is incumbent upon plaintiff to show that the injury
arose by accident out of and in the course of the emplyoment,
it is not necessary to prove the negligence of the employer, for
the rules of negligence are not applicable under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. It makes no difference whether the emthis rule
ployer was negligent or was free from fault, although
1
has been applied with some limitations by the board7
There is a presumption that the decedent met death by
accident in the course of the employment when he is found dead
on the scene of the employment. "Thus, when a person is found
dead, the law imparts to the circumstances the prima facie
significance that death was caused by accident rather than by
suicide. This presumption persists in its legal force until overcome by evidence. . . . The presumption that a deceased
"0 See 39, sapra.

THoZlenbach v. Hollenbach, 64, supra.
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workman committed suicide cannot be indulged in as a mere presumption, without any fact upon which it can be logically predicated, for the presumption is in favor of life, and the natural
desire to preserve rather than to destroy it. '72
This presumption that death occurred by accident in the
course of the employment when an employe is found dead was
discussed in one of the first cases to come before the Kentucky
board.7 3 The deceased was washing up, preparing to go home.
His fellow employes heard him give a cry of distress. They
rushed to him and found him lying upon an electric wire in
front of the wash basin. It was presumed that he had come in
contact with the wire while washing.
The court, in holding that the employe's death was caused
by an accident arising out of the employment, said: "It is said
that Hollenbach's death did not result from electric shock because the voltage was not sufficient to produce death. Decedent
was a strong man in the full enjoyment of his faculties at the
time the current struck him. The voltage may have been less
than is usually found to produce death. The wire burned into
his flesh. The current was so powerful that the other workmen
could not take hold of his body to remove him from the wire.
He died under the current. In such cases the presumption is
that the accident is the cause of the death and this presumption
will prevail unless overcome by evidence."
The burden of proof is upon the defendant affirmatively to
establish that the accident and injury were caused by the wilful misconduct of the injured employe. Nor is this burden met
74
when the element of wilfulness is left in doubt.
The common law rule excluding hearsay evidence is not
followed so strictly in compensation procedure. Hearsay evidence alone will not support an award in Kentucky, but is not
prejudicial if, independently of such evidence, there is sufficient
75
legally competent evidence to sustain the award.
In other words, hearsay evidence may be admitted but it
is not to be considered. Thus the admission of hearsay evidence
has a procedural effect but no probative effect. This is a re" Honnold on Workmen's Compensation, vol. 1, page 312.
?' See 71, supra.
7' Id.

,5Valentine v. Weaver, 64, supra.
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laxation of the common law rules with no practical benefit. The
hearsay evidence is admitted merely as corroborative evidence
-standing alone it is worthless.
This is logically unsound. If admitted at all, it should be
competent evidence. It seems .absolutely useless to admit hearsay evidence and then lay down the hard and fast rule that there
must always be sufficient legally competent evidence to support
the award. The admission of hearsay has gained the party
nothing at all-it merely encumbers the record.
The admission of hearsay evidence, even though it is not
given probative force, has one encouraging aspect. It shows a
further relaxation of the common law rules of evidence. It is
but a step to give it probative value.
The Kentucky act has no express provision as to evidence
and proof. The procedure is to be summary. Under such an
act it would be possible to admit certain kinds of hearsay evidence. The board is sufficiently trained to be able to give
such evidence its proper probative value. The old safeguards
that were thrown around the jury are not necessary in many
cases in administrative tribunals.
The common law right of cross-examination does not always
apply before administrative tribunals. Let us suppose that hearsay evidence of the declarations of the deceased party is admitted. The defendant has his opportunity to meet them wtih
proof of. his own. His rights are protected. Then the board
can be the judge of the value of both.
The writer is by no means ready to urge a letting down of
the bars in the admission of hearsay evidence. And yet, it
is again suggested that it is palpably useless to admit hearsay
evidence and give it no probative value. Kentucky has taken
a reasonably broad view in respect to hearsay"0 in admitting it
and in giving it corroborative value; it is urged that a forwardlooking administration of the act would give it probative value
as well in certain cases.
Although an award cannot be based on mere conjecture or
surmise, it will not be disturbed by a court on review, if supported by any evidence, although the preponderance thereof
appears to be to the contrary.7 7 This does not mean that the
11Rules of Evidence Before Commission, Frank A. Ross. 36 Harvard
Law Review, page 263.
"Andrews Steel co. v. McDermott, 64, supra.
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board may act arbitrarily, but simply that if there is any evidence at all to support the finding and there is nothing in the
record to indicate that there was fraud or misconduct on the
part of any person connected with the board, 'but simply an
exercise of independent judgment on the part of the board members, the finding will not be disturbed.
If there is any basis in the competent evidence to justify
the award, the finding will not be reversed merely because of
the introduction of evidence that would not be competent in a
law court7 8
Few of the cases which the Supreme Court has reviewed
have turned on the question of evidence. That is as it should be,
for the purpose of the act is to place compensation disputes in
the hands of trained men, competent to handle the situation in
each case, and the act purposes to have them hindered in their
investigations as little as possible by the rules of court procedure.
Roy M. MoRE
.
Lexington, Ky.

(To be continued.)
See 10, Iupra, at 242.

